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Trading Privacy for Promotion? Fourth
Amendment Implications of Employers Using
Wearable Sensors to Assess Worker Performance
George M. Dery III*
ABSTRACT
This Article considers the Fourth Amendment implications of a study on a passive
monitoring system where employees shared data from wearables, phone applications, and
position beacons that provided private information such as weekend phone use, sleep
patterns in the bedroom, and emotional states. The study’s authors hope to use the data
collected to create a new system for objectively assessing employee performance that will
replace the current system which is plagued by the inherent bias of self-reporting and peerreview and which is labor intensive and inefficient. The researchers were able to
successfully link the data collected with the quality of worker performance. This
technological advance raises the prospect of law enforcement gaining access to sensitive
information from employers for use in criminal investigations. This Article analyzes the
Fourth Amendment issues raised by police access to this new technology. Although the
Supreme Court currently finds government collection of a comprehensive chronicle of a
person’s life to constitute a Fourth Amendment search, widespread employee acceptance
of mobile sensing could undermine any claim in having a reasonable expectation of privacy
in such information. Additionally, employee tolerance of passive monitoring could make
employer data available to the government through third party consent. When previously
assessing employees’ privacy, the Court demonstrated a willingness to accept the needs of
the employer and society as justification for limiting workers’ Fourth Amendment rights.
Ultimately, then, Court precedent suggests that passive monitoring could erode Fourth
Amendment rights in the long term.
I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

MOBILE SENSING STUDY OF WORKER PERFORMANCE

III.

FOURTH AMENDMENT CONCERNS CREATED BY EMPLOYERS’ PASSIVE
MONITORING OF WORKERS’ PHONE USAGE, MOVEMENTS, AND PHYSIOLOGICAL
DATA
A. Over the Long Term, Widespread Employee Acceptance of Passive
Monitoring Could Lessen Privacy Expectations in Shared Information,
Undermining Claims that Police Commit a Fourth Amendment Search by
Accessing Employer Data
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B. Since the Court Has Previously Accepted the Needs of the Employer and
Society as Reasons to Significantly Limit Employees’ Reasonable Privacy
Expectations, the Court Could Allow Passive Monitoring of Employees
C. Employees’ Tolerance of, or Submission to, Passive Monitoring, Could
Make Employer Data Available to the Government Through Third Party
Consent, Making any Fourth Amendment Search Reasonable
IV.

CONCLUSION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps, as an employee, you were passed over for a promotion only to see someone
less qualified win the position. Maybe you were an employer who sought solid evidence
of job performance in order to select employees who would fulfill your organization’s
mission. Both workers and supervisors may reasonably dread the cumbersome and laborintensive review process of self-reports and supervisor evaluations that can be both
ineffective and biased. Both would benefit from an unbiased assessment system that could
increase efficiency and fairness.
Andrew Campbell, a computer science professor at Dartmouth College,1 decided to
test whether monitoring employees’ “physical, emotional, and behavioral well-being” with
smartphones, fitness trackers and position beacons2 could help employees seeking
promotion.3 Campbell’s idea prompted a study that created a “mobile sensing system” that
measured “employee performance with about 80 percent accuracy.”4 Claiming to have
objective data provided by the study’s wearable devices, an employee could now say,
“Here’s the evidence that I deserve to be promoted or that my boss is standing in my way.”5

*Professor, California State University Fullerton, Division of Politics, Administration, and Justice; Former
Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California; J.D., 1987, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A.
1983, University of California Los Angeles.
1
Peter Holley, Wearable technology started by tracking steps. Soon, it may allow your boss to track your
performance, THE WASHINGTON POST: (June 28, 2019) https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019
/06/28/wearable-technology-started-by-tracking-steps-soon-it-may-allow-your-boss-track-yourperformance/
2
Phones and wearables combine to assess worker performance: Mobile sensing and consumer tech
upgrade the
employee review, SCIENCE DAILY, SCIENCE NEWS (June 24, 2019) https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
2019/06/190624111606.htm (hereinafter “Science Daily, Phones and wearables”).
3
See Holley, supra note 1.
4
Id. This study resulted in the publication of the following paper: Shayan Mirjafari, Kizito Masaba, Ted
Grover, Weichen Wang, Pino AUdia, Andrew Campbell, Nitseh Chawla, Vedant Das Swain, Munmun De
Dhoudhury, Anind Dey, Sidney D’Mello, Ge Gao, Julie Gregg, Krithika Jagannath, Kaifeng Jiang, Suwen
Lin, Qiang Liu, Gloria Mark, Gonzalo Martinez, Stephen Mattingly, Edward Moskal, Raghu Mulukutla,
Subigya Nepal, Kari Nies, Manikanta Reddy, Pablo Robles-Granda, Kousuv Saha, Anusha Sirigiri, &
Aaron Striegel, Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers in the Workplace Using Mobile Sensing,
3 PROC. ACM INTERACTIVE MOB. WEARABLE UBIQUITOUS TECH., No. 2, Art. 37, (June 2019).
5
See Holley, supra note 1.
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While wearable sensors offer the promise of accuracy and fairness, these devices
create Fourth Amendment concerns.6 Indeed, the government has shown an interest in the
mobile sensing study. In the study’s acknowledgements, the authors noted that the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence and an Intelligence Advanced Research Projects
Activity contract in part supported its research.7 Even without such direct government
involvement, the study’s results could affect Fourth Amendment rights. Widespread
acceptance of the collection of personal data involving employees’ physical movements,
emotions, and habits could erode Fourth Amendment privacy expectations. The sensors
used in the study, which ran continuously,8 collected information such as heart rate, sleep
quality, and stress, and therefore accessed personal details encompassing bedroom habits
and psychological states.9 Should providing such information to an employee’s supervisor
become the norm, Fourth Amendment privacy expectations would be severely
diminished.10 Police, pursuing evidence on issues including alibi, proximity to crime scene,
and mental state, could mine a wealth of information by accessing the passive monitoring
data employers collected.
To be legally effective, however, such employee consent must be provided
voluntarily.11 In Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers in the Workplace Using
Mobile Sensing, participants’ privacy concerns were allayed by giving workers the option
to participate in the study.12 Should commercial and government employers adopt such
employee-monitoring technology, supervisors could likewise limit its use to volunteers.
This approach, however, brings up its own Fourth Amendment concerns. The researchers’
method of obtaining consent—offering workers $750 for participating—hints at a simple
way to overcome protests or even hesitation in making this technology common practice
in the workplace.13 Individuals might unwittingly weaken their Fourth Amendment rights
by consenting to employer monitoring. Employees might consent to wearing such
technology due to their need to obtain cash incentives, because of a hope of remaining
competitive for promotions, or simply to keep their jobs. These practical considerations
might mask an employee’s underlying wish to avoid monitoring.
In Part II, this Article examines the methods and conclusions of the study,
Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers in the Workplace Using Mobile Sensing.
Part III discusses Fourth Amendment issues created by this study. Specifically, this Article
analyzes whether use of passive monitoring technology in assessing workers’ performance
may undermine employees’ Fourth Amendment rights by eroding reasonable privacy
expectations. Part III of this Article also analyzes precedent in which the Court has deemed
The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This Article will focus on Fourth
Amendment issues and therefore federal and state laws on employee privacy, as well as individual
company policies regarding employee privacy, are beyond the scope of the Article.
7
See Mirjafari, supra note 4, at 21.
8
Id. at 8.
9
Id.
10
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court’s Fourth Amendment
privacy analysis is fully explored in Part III, below.
11
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
12
See Mirjafari, supra note 4, at 6.
13
Id.
6
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employees’ privacy to be significantly diminished, often due to the employees’ own
choices. Finally, this Article explores whether an employee’s sharing of personal data may
trigger the Court’s holdings that persons who share information with a third party assume
a risk that the third party might expose the information shared to police. Woven through
all of these issues is a concern about the voluntariness of employee decision-making in the
context of the competitive workplace. Ultimately, this Article suggests that, while
promoting fairness and efficiency, and eliminating bias, are noble goals, the use of
wearable technology in reaching such ends could create unintended and adverse Fourth
Amendment consequences.14
II.

MOBILE SENSING STUDY OF WORKER PERFORMANCE

The Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers study was meant to provide
both employers and employees access to hidden factors affecting job performance.15
Providing employees with precise links between their stress, lifestyle habits, and
productivity16 could “be the key to unlocking the best from every employee.”17 Study
coauthor, Andrew Campbell, decided to study mobile sensing of employees after noting
that Google, “one of the world’s premiere technology companies,” still relied on a
“traditional performance review” to assess its employees.18 This standard assessment
“typically relies on subjective input such as peer ratings, supervisor ratings and selfreported assessments, which is manual, burdensome, potentially biased and unreliable.”19
The study’s authors sought to examine a “radically new approach” to employee
assessment by using phones, wearables, and positional beacons to unobtrusively and
objectively measure performance.20 The researchers developed a “PhoneAgent”
application for Apple and Android phones to “continuously and passively” track an
employee’s “physical activity, location, phone usage (e.g. lock/unlock) and ambient light
levels.”21 The researchers also used a Garmin Viviosmart 3 wristband to collect data on
“heartrate, heartrate variability, and stress.”22 The Garmin wearable enables employees to
enter their weight and automatically measures “step count, calories burned, number of
floors climbed and physical activity (e.g., walking, running, etc.).”23 The study also relied

14

This Article considers the Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers study only to explore the
Fourth Amendment consequences of passively monitoring employees. The study’s scientific claims about
performance are beyond the scope of this Article.
15
See Holley, supra note 1.
16
Id.
17
See Science Daily, supra note 2.
18
See Holley, supra note 1.
19
See Mirjafari, supra note 4, at 2.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 8.
22
Id. (“Stress” is measured by Garmin’s “proprietary black box.”).
23
Id.
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on Gimbal beacons24 to measure “time spent at the office and home as well as breaks taken
away from a participant’s desk.”25
Over 500 working professionals in the United States used these devices as part of the
Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers study.26 The professionals, who worked
at technology companies and universities, could either participate in the yearlong study for
$750 or opt out of the study altogether.27 Both supervisors and non-supervisors
participated.28 Researchers strictly monitored participants’ compliance, calculating the
“compliance rate for each participant” by noting whether they had received data from a
subject “for each 30 minute time interval.”29 In measuring compliance for 48 30-minute
time slots in a 24-hour day, the study’s authors found it helpful to “stay in touch with
participants” to alert them to any observed problems with compliance rates.”30 At the end
of the study, the researchers paid the participants based on their average compliance rate.31
Ultimately, the aim of data collection was to “shed light on behavioral patterns that
characterize higher and lower performers.”32 The measurements, which were “processed
by cloud-based machine-learning algorithms,”33 produced results both “interesting” and
“potentially important.”34 Higher performers generally used their phones less throughout
the day.35 Some higher performers used the phones “less during weekday working hours
than during the same period at the weekend,”36 as well as less during the evenings of
workdays.37 Higher performers also showed differences in their mobility and activity;38
they were “more active and mobile in comparison to lower performers.”39 Sleep differed
between higher and lower performing employees.40 Higher performers experienced “longer
deep sleep periods during survey days and shorter light sleep periods during weekends.”41
Id. (Describing beacons as “low energy radio modules that transmit and receive radio signals to and from
other Bluetooth enable devices. The PhoneAgent app on the phone implements a Gimbal API library that
enables the phone to detect encounters with beacons. To understand the protocol, consider smartphone A
and beacon B. When A approaches B, A will receive the signal transmitted by B and report its signal
strength. Generally, this signal strength increases as A and B are closer to each other. In this way, we can
capture the mobility of participants at work.”).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 6.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 9.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 5. The researchers defined workplace performance with reference to a variety of skills, specifically,
“how well workers and employees perform their tasks, the initiative they take and the resourcefulness they
show in solving problems.” Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). A high performer was one who is “well aware of
his or her role in the organization, and executes the underlying tasks and role well.” Id.
33
See Holley, supra note 1.
34
The researchers asserted their findings offered “important insights into higher and lower performers” and
found what they called “a number of interesting results.” See Mirjafari, supra note 4, at 18.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
“Mobility” is defined as “movement and places visited.” Id. at 19. “Activity” is “stationary or moving
around.” Id. at 19.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 20.
41
Id. at 20.
24
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The authors surmised that since “deep sleep is important in memory reactivation and
consolidation,” accumulating deep sleep might “be a crucial factor that allows higher
performers to retain and recall information that enhances their performance.”42 Finally, the
quality of work performance varied with heartbeat as higher performers experienced “more
regular heart beat rates during the week particularly weekdays.”43 The study’s passive
sensors, therefore, found close links between workplace performance and weekend phone
use, sleep in one’s own bed, and the rhythm of one’s own heartbeat—personal details long
considered beyond the relevance of an employer’s attention. The researchers saw their
study as only the beginning, noting their work “opens the way to new forms of passive
objective assessment and feedback to workers to potentially provide week-by-week or
quarter-by-quarter guidance in the workplace.”44
FOURTH AMENDMENT CONCERNS CREATED BY EMPLOYERS’ PASSIVE MONITORING OF
WORKERS’ PHONE USAGE, MOVEMENTS, AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA

III.

A. Over the Long Term, Widespread Employee Acceptance of Passive Monitoring Could
Lessen Privacy Expectations in Shared Information, Undermining Claims that Police
Commit a Fourth Amendment Search by Accessing Employer Data
Law enforcement, in its ongoing effort to improve its investigations, could find an
employer’s accumulation of passive monitoring data a ready tool aiding its crime detection.
Any inquiry into privacy issues of passive monitoring begins with Katz v. United States,
the seminal case providing the Court’s most recent definition of a Fourth Amendment
“search.”45 In Katz, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents attached an electronic
listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth to record Katz’s voice as he
illegally transmitted “wagering information.”46 In considering whether the FBI’s
eavesdropping implicated Fourth Amendment privacy rights, the Court recognized that
when Katz occupied the phone booth, shut its door, and paid his toll, he was “surely entitled
to assume that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece [would] not be broadcast to the
world.”47 Therefore, the FBI’s eavesdropping on Katz’s call “violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search
and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”48

42

Id.
Id. at 20.
44
Id. at 21. Study coauthor Pino Audia––a professor of management and organizations at Dartmouth’s
Tuck School of Business—suggested: “Passive sensors, which are the heart of the mobile sensing system
used in this research, promise to replace the surveys that have long been the primary source of data to
identify key correlates of high and low performers.” Science Daily, supra note 2.
45
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Note, that the Court, in United
States v. Jones, resurrected the “common law trespass” definition of a Fourth Amendment search described
in the prohibition era case, Olmstead v. United States. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). The Olmstead/Jones physical intrusion test, however,
is beyond the scope of this Article.
46
Id. at 348.
47
Id. at 352.
48
Id. at 353.
43
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Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, provided an explanation of what is now
recognized49 as the Court’s definition of a Fourth Amendment search: “My understanding
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”50 Justice
Harlan further noted, “a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy.”51 In contrast, “objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’
of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited.”52 Justice Harlan’s reference to exposure of items to plain view, along with the
Court’s warning that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,”53 demonstrate that Katz
crafted a double-edged sword. Katz extended Fourth Amendment privacy to places outside
the home, intoning, “Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”54 At the same time, however, Katz refused
to extend privacy protection to such a traditionally private area as the home if the
homeowner’s own actions exposed that locale to the public by plain view.55 The Court thus
placed part of the privacy determination in the hands of the individual—if one wishes
something to be private from government scrutiny, one must avoid conduct that could
expose information to others, even civilians.
The significance of Katz’s inclusion in its “search” definition of the impact of
individual conduct on privacy was dramatically demonstrated in United States v. Miller.56
In Miller, the defendant was charged with having an unregistered still, possessing 175
gallons of whiskey, and failing to pay the whiskey tax.57 Miller moved to suppress bank
records that the government obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.58 The Court
found “no legitimate expectation of privacy” in the contents of Miller’s banking records
because Miller’s checks, deposit slips, and other records were “not confidential
communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions” and
thus not protected by the Fourth Amendment.59 Accordingly, the Court found Miller’s
argument that he only gave the banks documents “for a limited purpose” unconvincing
because all of the documents contained “only information voluntarily conveyed to the
The Court in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) noted, “Consistently with Katz, this Court
uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking
its protection can claim a “justifiable,” a “reasonable,” or a “legitimate expectation of privacy” that has
been invaded by government action.” Smith further specified, “This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly
noted in his Katz concurrence, normally embraces two discrete questions. The first is whether the
individual, by his conduct, has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy...The second
question is whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.’” Id.
50
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 351.
54
Id. at 359.
55
Id. at 351 (Holding that “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”)
56
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
57
Id. at 436.
58
Id. at 436-37.
59
Id.
49
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banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”60 Miller
emphasized the individual’s own conduct in undermining the reasonableness of his
assertion of privacy expectations, noting that each depositor “takes the risk, in revealing
his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.”61 The Court thereby created what has become known as the “third party
doctrine,”62 which dictates that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”63
The Court reaffirmed the third party doctrine in Smith v. Maryland, where police
investigated a man who made “threatening and obscene phone calls” to a victim he
previously robbed.64 By tracing the license plate of Smith’s vehicle, officers identified his
phone number.65 Police then used a pen register66 to collect the numbers dialed from
Smith's home phone,67 leading to evidence used to convict him of robbery.68 Smith raised
the issue of whether use of a pen register constituted a Fourth Amendment search.”69 Smith
ruled that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed
from his phone, and therefore, that the police did not commit a “search” in using a pen
register to collect those numbers.70 The pen register, which only disclosed numbers of a
phone call rather than the call’s content, possessed only “limited capabilities” for privacy
invasion.71 The typical phone user understood that she must convey the numbers dialed to
the phone company in order to complete the call.72 As a result, the Court again declared
that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties.”73 Smith, in using his phone, “voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in
the ordinary course of business.”74 He therefore assumed a risk that the phone company
would reveal this information to police.75 The act of sharing effectively destroyed
reasonable privacy expectations.
The Court seriously reassessed the third party doctrine in Carpenter v. United States,
involving law enforcement collection of cell-site location information (CSLI)76 in an
60

Id.
Id. at 443.
62
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
63
Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
64
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 736, n. 1 (Noting that “A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It does
not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually completed.”).
67
Id. at 737.
68
Id. at 737-38.
69
Id. at 736.
70
Id. at 745-46.
71
Id. at 741-42.
72
Id. at 743.
73
Id. at 743-44.
74
Id. at 744.
75
Id.
76
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
61
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investigation of a series of robberies occurring in Michigan and Ohio.77 CSLI exists
because every smartphone constantly scans its area to obtain “the best signal, which
generally comes from the closest cell site.”78 Smartphones “tap into the wireless network
several times a minute whenever their signal is on, even if the owner is not using one of
the phone's features.”79 Further, every time a phone connects to a cell site, “it generates a
time-stamped record known as cell-site location information (CSLI).”80 Federal
prosecutors obtained a court order for providers MetroPCS and Sprint to hand over CSLI
for Timothy Carpenter’s cellphone.81 The court orders82 in Carpenter enabled the
government to collect “12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter's movements—an
average of 101 data points per day.”83 The CSLI “placed Carpenter’s phone near four of
the charged robberies” at the “exact time” of the robberies.84 Carpenter was convicted and
sentenced to “more than 100 years in prison.”85
In Carpenter, the Court evaluated whether Government access to “historical cell
phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements”
constituted a Fourth Amendment search.86 Troubled by the comprehensiveness of the
information at issue,87 the Court emphasized the ubiquity of phones, noting that phone
accounts outnumbered people in the United States.88 The Carpenter Court thus declared
that it was confronting a “new phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person's past
movements through the record of his cell phone signals.”89 The fact that CSLI was
“detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” was particularly alarming to the
Court.90 Specifically, CSLI gave an in-depth record of the holder’s whereabouts over the
course of several months, providing “an intimate window into a person's life, revealing not
only his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations.’”91 CSLI not only expanded the government’s ability to
track someone in space, but it enabled police to “travel back in time to retrace a person's
whereabouts, subject only to the retention polices of the wireless carriers, which currently
maintain records for up to five years.”92 Ultimately, the Court worried about leaving
citizens “at the mercy of advancing technology,” which could “encroach upon areas
normally guarded from inquisitive eyes.”93 The Carpenter Court therefore held that the
77

Id. at 2212.
Id. at 2211.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 2212.
81
Carpenter was one of the alleged robbers. Id.
82
Federal Magistrate judges issued the orders in this case. Id. at 2212.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 2213.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 2211.
87
Carpenter emphasized the comprehensiveness of the government intrusion, mentioning: “comprehensive
chronicle,” Id. at 2206; “comprehensive record,” Id. at 221; “comprehensive dossier,” Id. at 2220; and
“comprehensive reach.” Id. at 2223.
88
“There are 396 million cell phone service accounts in the United States—for a Nation of 326 million
people.” Id. at 2212.
89
Id. at 2216.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 2217.
92
Id. at 2218.
93
Id. at 2214.
78
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government, in collecting CSLI, “invaded Carpenter's reasonable expectation of privacy in
the whole of his physical movements.”94
The Carpenter Court’s wariness of new technology that creates a “comprehensive
chronicle” of a person’s life could offer support to employees wishing to shield their
passive monitoring data from police scrutiny.95 Technology that detects each time an
employee leaves her desk,96 picks up her phone,97 or experiences a change in heart rate,98
readily qualifies as information that is “detailed and encyclopedic”99 and as an “allencompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.”100
Moreover, the ease of employer data collection from “continuous sensing tools”
would reasonably trouble a Court concerned about the effortlessness of information
gathering from CSLI.101 Employers’ ability to store data for years or even decades to use
in promotion and pay raise decisions would likely offend the Court that was troubled by
the storage of CSLI data for only five years.102 Indeed, the employer’s intrusion here is
even greater than that posed by CSLI because wearables give information about sleep, thus
providing a window into employees’ bedrooms.103 Further, wearables probe an employees’
heart rate, a physiological function magnitudes more personal than information about one’s
location on a public street.104 The passive monitoring data thus provides clues to a worker’s
“emotional and behavioral well-being” and psychological states, intrusions beyond
anything possible with CSLI.105 Finally, wearables count both steps taken and calories
burned, revealing evidence of physical fitness and weight, which can be quite sensitive
subjects. Thus, confronted with the combined scrutiny from wearables, phones, and
beacons of employees, courts could rightly find an invasion of reasonable privacy
expectations, as the Supreme Court did in Carpenter.106
Carpenter’s defense of one’s right to privacy from passive monitoring, however,
must contend with other third party cases that define the boundaries of reasonable privacy
expectations more broadly.107 Specifically, Katz warned that the Fourth Amendment did
not protect information knowingly exposed to the public.108 Employees who submit to
wearables, phone applications, and beacons could be said to have reduced their own
privacy by choosing to display data to the “plain view” of outsiders.109 Further, under
Miller, employees’ movements, phone usage, heart rate, and sleep could be labeled as “the
94

Id. at 2219.
Id. at 2211.
96
See Mirjafari, supra note 4 at 8.
97
Id. at 18.
98
Id. at 20.
99
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
100
Id. at 2217.
101
Id. at 2216.
102
Carpenter warned of CSLI, “With just the click of a button, the Government can access each carrier's
deep repository of historical location information at practically no expense.” Id. at 2218.
103
See Mirjafari, supra note 4, at 20.
104
Id.; Carpenter involved government intrusions “in an area accessible to the public.” See Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2217.
105
Science Daily, supra note 2; Mirjafari, supra note 4, at 8.
106
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
107
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
108
Id. at 351.
109
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
95
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business records” of the employer, who has established a “substantial stake in their
continued availability and acceptance” as evidence justifying employment decisions.110
Further, any employee who argues that she gave access to this personal data only for the
“limited purpose” of performance assessment would be offering a contention already
rejected by the Court.111 Thus, Miller would not protect employees who “voluntarily
conveyed” and “exposed” such personal data to their employers in “the ordinary course of
business.”112 Miller suggests that employees took a “risk” in revealing their data to their
employers, since the data could “be conveyed by [the employer] to the Government.”113
The answer to these arguments resides in the dramatic advancement of technology.
Carpenter found the traditional third party arguments unconvincing because new
technology, such as CSLI, was simply so “qualitatively different” from the relatively
simple banking and pen register technology considered in Smith and Miller114 that these
cases offered little guidance in the 21st century. Third party doctrine thus failed to “contend
with the seismic shifts in digital technology.”115
Moreover, third party doctrine, premised on actively opting in to the sharing of
information, does not adequately address voluntariness. The Carpenter Court noted that
the third party doctrine was based on the reduced privacy expectations caused by
knowingly sharing information.116 This “voluntary exposure” rationale, however, did not
“hold up” for CSLI because this data was “not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands
the term.”117 Since cell phones were “indispensable to participation in modern society” and
collection of CSLI occurred “without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up,” Carpenter concluded “in no meaningful sense” did a phone user voluntarily
assume the risk of “turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”118
Similarly, monitored employees do not consciously upload the information for their
employers because all data is passively collected.119 An employee, like a cellphone user, is
not truly sharing this information in an active manner as Miller did when writing a check
or Smith did in dialing a number.
However, in any workplace following the study design in Differentiating Higher and
Lower Job Performers, the employee would make an initial conscious choice to share his
data with his employer, opting into a program and receiving compensation for
participating. This decision to opt in could cause the Court to find that the employee
triggered the Fourth Amendment’s traditional third party doctrine of Miller and Smith,
rather than the exception in Carpenter. Such employees opting into information-sharing
schemes create difficult issues about the true nature of voluntariness.
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The specter of employees torn by the choice between privacy and compensation is
already playing out in work environments today. United Parcel Service (UPS) gathers data
on its employees every day by using a black box in its trucks to record a driver’s activity
“to the second when he opens or closes the door behind him, buckles his seat belt and []
starts the truck.”120 UPS then analyzes these measurements to improve productivity.121 This
monitoring affects UPS’ bottom line, as “[j]ust one minute per driver per day over the
course of a year adds up to $14.5 million.”122 Since UPS can now improve a driver’s
delivery rate from 90 to 120 packages a day, the company views data as “about as important
as the package.”123 The smallest movements do not escape notice. For instance, upon
noticing that opening drivers’ doors with a key slowed the drivers down, UPS switched to
key fobs.124 As one driver acknowledged, the tracking “feel[s] like big brother.”125 The
driver reasoned, however, that he could not allow himself to perceive the monitoring as a
personal attack because if he did, his frustration could lead him to not “even want to do it
anymore.”126 The pain of intrusion on driver’s privacy is superseded, however, by financial
incentive; UPS drivers, are “the highest paid in the business.”127 Thus, the practical realities
of making a living have required drivers to trade privacy for compensation. Do UPS drivers
calmly and fully consider the long view when accepting monitoring, or do they only
consider the next rent payment? Have drivers, in choosing to accept monitoring, thought
about and assumed the risk that UPS might choose to share their information with law
enforcement? In short, can it truly be said that UPS drivers voluntarily chose to expose this
information to a third party?
If drivers have become inured to sharing their movements, other employees might
reasonably become accustomed to sharing more personal data, such as phone use, sleep in
the bedroom, and the beating of one’s own heart. These shifts in attitudes could
significantly affect Fourth Amendment privacy rights. The Carpenter Court might shudder
at the thought of compiling a comprehensive chronicle of a person’s movements; but, UPS
drivers could see such a prospect as old news.128 Thus, Carpenter’s effectiveness in
promoting the rights of passively monitored employees could, as time passes, become the
slenderest of reeds upon which to lean, given the consent given by employees for such
monitoring.
Employees’ inurement to privacy invasion leads to another concern: any assertion of
a right to privacy from passive monitoring would need to account for the ever evolving,
and perhaps dissipating, nature of Katz’s reasonable privacy expectations in the wake of
daily advancing technological intrusions. Society’s recognition of what constitutes a
reasonable privacy expectation will inevitably evolve over time. Although Carpenter
declared “the Court is obligated—as ‘[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading
privacy have become available to the Government’—to ensure that the ‘progress of

120

Id.
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
121

28

Vol. 16:1]

George M. Dery III

science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections,”129 the Court’s ability to protect
privacy from technology’s inroads on society’s reasonable expectation of privacy is
alarmingly inconstant. The very process of scientific advancement could numb the
populace to the intrusiveness of ever more ubiquitous technology.
Society’s incremental acceptance of the erosion of privacy is demonstrated by one
of the most common law enforcement intrusions, the Terry stop and frisk, recognized by
the Court in Terry v. Ohio.130 In 1968, when the Terry Court considered a pat down frisk
of a detainee, it did not minimize the severity of the government intrusion, instead noting
that the “careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her
body in an attempt to find weapons” was “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be
undertaken lightly.”131 Justice Scalia even questioned “whether the fiercely proud men
who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on
mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such indignity.”132 With quickly
advancing technology, however, electronic frisks for weapons at airports and large venues
are now seen as only a hassle rather than a “petty indignity,” a label Terry dismissed as
inadequately describing the intrusive nature of its frisk.133 Societal acceptance of electronic
frisks is now unremarkable, even though the practice is arguably more intrusive than a pat
down on the street.134 In fact, airport security scanners have found cysts and hernias,
something not expected from a constable on patrol.135
The changing view of pat down frisks is not the only example of society’s gradual
acceptance of technologies used by authorities to gather personal information. In Katz, the
Court deemed electronic eavesdropping on only one side of a phone conversation to be a
Fourth Amendment search.136 Now, however, people are accustomed to overhearing one
side of a cell phone call, whether in a restaurant, a waiting room, or on the sidewalk.
Further, “[c]ookies track our every move online”137—whether we are visiting sites
regarding medical conditions, politics, or religion—with little reaction from the public
other than a shrug of futility.
The Court considered whether government use of a thermal imager to detect heat
from inside a home in an effort to detect marijuana cultivation constituted a Fourth
Amendment search in Kyllo v. United States.138 The Kyllo Court established a “firm” and
“bright” rule that when “the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
129
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intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.”139 Today, Kyllo’s privacy concerns sound almost quaint, as stores use
sophisticated technology that, in one instance, told a father his daughter was pregnant
before the daughter did.140 Yet, people still shop. So, even though in the fifties, “The
Adventures Ozzie and Harriet” show made television history by having Ozzie and Harriet
“share a double bed,” today, many might be unfazed that employees share sleep data with
their employer even though it was gathered in the employee’s bed.141
So, in the near term, pursuant to Carpenter, the Court would likely determine that
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy from passive monitoring’s creation of
“a comprehensive dossier.”142 If past is prologue, however, in the future such passively
collected data might become a societal norm no longer deemed deserving of privacy
protections. Although the Court might maintain Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy
definition, this test’s reach will be so diminished that it no longer offers protection to
employees.
B. Since the Court Has Previously Accepted the Needs of the Employer and
Society as Reasons to Significantly Limit Employees’ Reasonable Privacy Expectations,
the Court Could Allow Passive Monitoring of Employees
Precedent assessing the Fourth Amendment privacy of employees offers additional
insight into protections for workers’ privacy from police pursuit of passive monitoring data.
Over a half-century ago, in Mancusi v. Deforte, the Court applied the Katz test in weighing
the privacy expectations of a Teamsters Union official.143 In Mancusi, a grand jury indicted
Frank DeForte “on charges of conspiracy, coercion, and extortion” for forcing juke box
owners to pay him tribute.144 State agents committed a warrantless search of an office
DeForte shared with other union officials.145 The Court considered whether DeForte had
“a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion” in the union office.146
Mancusi noted that even though DeForte had a large room for an office and shared this
space with others, he could still affect the reasonableness of his own privacy
expectations.147 Since DeForte spent considerable time in his office and had “custody” of
139
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his papers, the Mancusi Court ruled that he had a Fourth Amendment right to contest the
invasion.148 DeForte enjoyed privacy because he could “expect that he would not be
disturbed except by personal or business invitees, and that records would not be taken
except with his permission or that of his union superiors.”149 When assessing the
constitutional impact of individuals sharing access to information, the Court in Mancusi
reasoned quite differently for employee expectations than it did for the third parties in
Miller and Smith. Specifically, DeForte’s sharing of an office did not fundamentally change
his privacy because he could have reasonably expected that only certain persons would
enter the office and that records would only be accessed with permission.150 In contrast,
the Court rejected such reasonable assumptions in Miller and Smith due to the exposure of
information to third parties.151
Nearly two decades later, the Court considered the Fourth Amendment rights of
employees in O’Connor v. Ortega, a civil case involving a psychiatrist contesting his
dismissal from a state hospital for sexual harassment and other improprieties.152 The
psychiatrist’s superiors made a thorough search of his office, seizing “several items from
Dr. Ortega's desk and file cabinets, including a Valentine's Day card, a photograph, and a
book of poetry all sent to Dr. Ortega by a former resident physician.”153 The Court
considered whether Dr. Ortega, “a public employee, had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office, desk, and file cabinets at his place of work.”154 O’Connor defined a
“workplace” as including an area or item “related to work” and “generally within the
employer’s control.”155 Accordingly, the workplace involved tangible items and places,
such as “hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets.”156 The Court also discussed
personal items an employee brought to the workplace. If an employee placed a personal
item, such as a photograph, on a desk or bulletin board, the areas holding personal objects
still remained “part of the workplace.”157 However, the items themselves, such as a
“handbag or briefcase,” could still remain outside the “workplace” designation even if they
physically existed in a place of work.158 Overall, employees had a reasonable expectation
of privacy, even in the workplace context, against police intrusions into private areas such
as personal offices.159
O’Connor warned that “actual office practices and procedures” could alter the
“operational realities of the workplace” so significantly that employees’ reasonable privacy
expectations could be diminished.160 For instance, employees’ offices might be
148
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“continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits,” thus eroding privacy
expectations.161 Indeed, “some government offices might be so open to fellow employees
or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable.”162 Recognizing the “plethora”
of workplace contexts, O’Connor cautioned that employee privacy assessments required
case-by-case analyses.163 The operational realities of O’Connor’s workplace ultimately led
the Court to accept that “Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his
desk and file cabinets.”164
O'Connor's application of the Fourth Amendment to the case, however, did not
provide the employee all traditional Fourth Amendment protections. Since the searches
were performed by government employers investigating worker malfeasance rather than
by police pursuing evidence in a criminal investigation, the O’Connor Court deemed the
case to be one of “special needs.”165 In such a case, the Court weighs “legitimate privacy
interests of public employees in the private objects they bring to the workplace” against
the government interests occasioned by “the realities of the workplace.”166 The needs of
the public employer in completing “the government agency's work in a prompt and efficient
manner” outweighed the privacy concerns of the employee who could “avoid exposing
personal belongings at work by simply leaving them at home.”167 The weight given to the
employer’s special needs ultimately led the Court to forgo both the Fourth Amendment
requirement that searches be supported by a warrant168 and the mandate that searches be
based on probable cause.169
As a special needs case, O’Connor might seem unhelpful in determining how the
Court would handle a law enforcement search of employer records for evidence of a crime.
O’Connor, however, is part of a collection of special needs cases in which the Court
consistently ruled against providing the traditional protections of a warrant and probable
cause to employees. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, for instance, the Court
considered whether Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations, which either
mandated or authorized the collection of biological samples from railroad employees,
violated the Fourth Amendment.170 One such FRA regulation171 required that railroads
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collect blood and urine samples from employees involved in any recent railroad accident.172
Skinner held that compelled blood alcohol tests amounted to Fourth Amendment
searches.173 Likewise, since there existed “few activities in our society more personal or
private than the passing of urine,” Skinner recognized that urine tests intruded upon
reasonable expectations of privacy.”174 Importantly, however, despite the sensitive nature
of the intrusions involved, the government’s special need in ensuring railroad safety
outweighed the intrusions of employee privacy.175
While recognizing that the toxicological testing of employees could be viewed as
significant in other situations, the Court found railroads involved diminished privacy
expectations.176 Even though the Court noted that the passing of urine is so private that
most persons “describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all,”177 Skinner equated the
privacy intrusion associated with the FRA urine collection akin to an annual physical.178
Further, the Court found a blood test’s intrusion insignificant since such “tests are a
commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations.”179 Finally, the Court found
the employees, by choosing to participate in the regulated industry of railroads, diminished
their own privacy expectations.180 The employees’ privacy rights were thus so diminished,
in comparison to the needs of the employers, that Skinner upheld the biological collections
without requiring a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion.181
United States Customs Service employees in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab fared little better than the railroad workers in Skinner.182 In Von Raab, agents
were subject to drug testing when seeking Customs Service positions requiring the carrying
of a firearm or directly involving drug interdiction.183 Invoking “special government
needs,” the Court declared, “it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.”184
Accordingly, the “operational realities of the workplace” might “render entirely reasonable
certain work-related intrusions by supervisors and co-workers that might be viewed as
unreasonable in other contexts.”185 In this context, customs employees working directly
with drugs and guns had lessened privacy expectations.186 The agents’ privacy interests
therefore did not outweigh the government’s interests in their “fitness and probity.”187 The
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warrantless and suspicionless biological testing was thus reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.188
Special needs precedent is not alone in restricting the Fourth Amendment rights of
employees. The Court has also used employees’ own choices to limit their Fourth
Amendment rights against seizure of the person.189 In I.N.S. v. Delgado, the Court
considered the Fourth Amendment implications of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service’s (INS) use of “factory surveys” to determine if workers at three garment factories
were undocumented.190 To carry out the surveys, some INS agents would position
“themselves near the buildings’ exits” while others “dispersed throughout the factory to
question most, but not all, employees at their work stations.”191 The INS agents, wearing
badges and armed with weapons and walkie-talkies, asked workers about their
exception that proves the rule that the Court has shown little interest in providing the traditional protections
of a warrant and probable cause to employees. See George M. Dery III, Are Politicians More Deserving of
Privacy than Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment
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the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State School
Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of
Labor, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the superior
courts, district attorneys, members of the General Assembly, and members of the Public Service
Commission.
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citizenship.192 Yet, “employees continued with their work and were free to walk around
within the factory.”193 As a result, Delgado found that “these factory surveys did not result
in the seizure of the entire work forces.”194 Specifically, the Court rejected the contention
that placement of INS agents created a seizure of all workers at the factories because
employees’ “freedom to move about” at work is meaningfully restricted by their own
“voluntary obligations to their employers” rather than “by the actions of law enforcement
officials.”195 Once again, an employee could undermine her own Fourth Amendment claim
by personal choices made in the course of work.
The Court’s early case, Mancusi, provides a basis for considering employees’
privacy against police collection of passive monitoring data. Fifty years ago, the Court
viewed employees’ rights as relatively robust, for DeForte could overcome the limits to his
privacy caused by sharing.196 DeForte could preserve his privacy by using time and
exercising possession—he won back his privacy by spending a “considerable amount of
time” in the shared office and by maintaining “custody” of his papers.197 Further, he could
reasonably expect fellow employees to respect his privacy since they were expected to
forgo touching his items unless permitted by supervisors.198 The Court made no mention
that employees assume any risk of others sharing items or information with police.199 If
Mancusi was the only case addressing employees’ Fourth Amendment rights, workers
might expect to maintain privacy from police requests for data regarding location, phone
usage, and emotional states implied from heart rate. If an employee may reasonably expect
privacy from police intrusion into an office, she certainly should reasonably assume
privacy from official intrusion into a private cell phone located in the office or in data
collected not from the office, but from the bedroom. An employee’s sharing of such data
would not lead to diminished privacy expectations, in light of the shared nature of
DeForte’s office. However, technological advances and workplace norms have affected
employees’ lives in the half-century since the Court decided Mancusi.
O’Connor, which defined the “boundaries of the workplace context” nineteen years
after Mancusi, offers workers less assurance of privacy in passive monitoring data.200
O’Connor might be a less than perfect fit, however, considering its 1980s context, where
the workplace involved tangible office spaces separate from the home, as opposed to digital
data.201 O’Connor, therefore, spoke of a workplace exclusively “related to work” and
“within the employer’s control,” notions that dissolve when considering employees
increasingly work from home with digital devices.202 Moreover, the crucial point of the
Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers study is that behavior seemingly
unconnected to work, whether phone use on weekends, mobility on weekends, deep sleep
in one’s own bedroom, or heart rate in one’s own body, are now directly “related to work”
192
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since activities affect worker performance.203 While an employee’s phone usage,
movements, sleep, and heart rate are not directly within the employer’s control, via
constant monitoring, they are within a supervisor’s continual view. The practical purpose
of measuring such behavior is to modify it for optimum performance. Employers might
turn job reviews into coaching sessions encouraging more exercise on the weekends,
avoidance of alcohol that can impair sleep, and earlier bedtimes. The Differentiating
Higher and Lower Job Performers study’s results hinted at such prodding, as the
researchers meticulously checked the “compliance rate for each participant” for each of 48
time slots in a 24-hour day,204 with the study authors finding it “useful” to inform
participants of any “problems with their compliance rates.”205 This was bolstered by a
carrot/stick approach because employees were compensated according to compliance rates
in wearing the devices.206 O’Connor—decided well before the digital revolution—could
not have predicted such employer scrutiny of employees, let alone offer specific rules for
this passive monitoring.
A further disconnect between O’Connor and workers today involves the personal
items employees bring to the workplace. O’Connor took care to protect the privacy of the
contents of items employees brought to their jobsites, such as briefcases. 207 Today, it is
these very items—cell phones, tablets, and wearables—which intrude on employee
privacy. While O’Connor suggested to employees that they could avoid privacy intrusions
by simply leaving personal items at home, 208 the Court recently recognized the practical
impossibility of such a suggestion.209
Despite its limitations, O’Connor may provide some understanding about the Court’s
views concerning employee monitoring. The most helpful guidance for assessing the
privacy of passively monitored data comes from O’Connor’s general admonition to
consider “actual office practices and procedures” to measure the “operational realities of
the workplace.”210 In a formal sense, an office’s “practices and procedures” are the written
and agreed-upon guidelines directly addressing employee privacy policies. Such
procedures, however, form only a part of the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis,
which considers “all the circumstances.”211 The actual “operational realities of the
workplace,” which play out daily, could undermine written employment policies.212
Employees who need a pay increase for financial stability, are ambitious for the next
promotion, or fear losing their jobs in a competitive workplace might be vulnerable to
employer suggestions that money, advancement, and job security could be bolstered by
“voluntary” participation in a passive monitoring program. Concern about the prospect of
not being perceived as a team player could increase pressure to opt in. Indeed, teambuilding
203
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itself is an example of a corporate practice that could significantly alter a workplace’s
operational realities.
Teambuilding has been called “the most important investment you can make for your
people” because it boosts “the bottom line.213 Employers therefore try to mold workers into
teams through a dizzying variety of exercises: holding a “daily huddle,”214 “great white
shark-spotting,” entry into a “Spy School Program” complete with crossbow-shooting,
having a lesson to learn how to survive a plane crash, 215 employee trivia games, creating
one’s own job title, and escape rooms.216 It is not enough to build a team; teamwork must
be “baked” into a company’s culture.217 Team building can exploit game theory, which
“leverages people’s natural tendencies to compete” and “strive for status.”218 Employers
could encourage employees to opt into teams of workers who compete against each other
to improve their teams’ numbers on company-appropriate phone use, exercise and
movement metrics, hours and stages of sleep, and even regularity of heart rates. Employers
could even incentivize “compliance” with passive monitoring by rewarding those teams
whose members shared the most information during a 48-time slot 24-hour day.219 At an
early stage of monitoring, any employee concerned about preserving her own privacy need
simply not join, and consequently only lose out on the “extras” earned by more “dedicated”
employees.220 If participation, with its monetary rewards, became the norm, however, the
few holdouts would find themselves in an “operational reality” of routine employee
disclosure of information and therefore could no longer expect privacy to be the norm at
such a business.
The workplaces operating with large buy-ins by employees focused on raises or
promotions, in stripping employees of privacy, would begin to resemble those employing
railroad workers in Skinner or United States Customs agents in Von Raab.221 When
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assessing privacy, context is crucial because the “operational realities of the workplace”
could recast intrusions “unreasonable in other contexts” as “entirely reasonable” for
“certain work-related intrusions.”222 If the company culture prods employees to share
specifics about sleep or phone use, whether in the context of team building or as part of a
competition for financial incentives, such collective disclosure could change the work
landscape. This could ultimately lead the Court to find access to such information “entirely
reasonable,”223 despite the intimate nature of the information. Since Skinner already
allowed the collection of blood and urine, passive monitoring to gather sleep and heart rate
data could progressively appear to be within the corporate norm. Pursuant to Skinner, the
Court might even blame the employee for her diminished privacy expectations by
reminding the worker that she chose to participate by taking the job (or in opting into the
monitoring program) in the first place.224 The Court has used employees’ choices to limit
not only their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches, but also against
unreasonable seizures. In Delgado, the Court refused to find that garment employees had
been seized by federal agents standing at the factory exits because these workers
voluntarily chose to meaningfully limit their own movement by agreeing to stay at the
factory while working.225 These workers’ decisions, probably taken without much
reflection beyond wishing to have a job, had dramatic legal consequences: employees
found no Fourth Amendment protection from INS agents standing at the factory door.226
Employee Fourth Amendment rights have devolved considerably since DeForte
vindicated his right to privacy in his shared office in 1968 in Mancusi.227 While the Court
could find that employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data gathered by
passive monitoring, such a ruling is in no way guaranteed. The Court could instead apply
O’Connor’s definition of a “workplace” to determine that data about an employee’s
emotional state, nightly sleep, or weekend activity relevant to productivity on the job is
now appropriately “related to work.”228 Since such activities or attributes directly affect a
company’s bottom line, they could be deemed “generally within the employer’s control.”229
O’Connor’s “operational realities of the workplace” test, applied on a case-by-case basis,
takes on a fluid quality that changes with each job and thus provides scant hope of
permanent protection.230 The one constant seems to be that the Court, whether following
O’Connor, Skinner, or Delgado, will hold an employee to the decision she makes, whether
in bringing something personal to work231 or in taking the job in the first place.232
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C. Employees’ Tolerance of, or Submission to, Passive Monitoring, Could Make
Employer Data Available to the Government Through Third Party Consent, Making any
Fourth Amendment Search Reasonable
Even if an employee’s choice to opt into passive collection of data does not trigger
Miller’s third party doctrine,233 or so alter the operational realities of the workplace as to
erode privacy expectations,234 such a decision could have Fourth Amendment significance
due to the third party consent exception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, the Court
has ruled that law enforcement may intrude on a person’s privacy, without a warrant, when
it has gained consent from someone who possesses “common authority over or other
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”235 The Court
recognized this “third party consent” principle in United States v. Matlock, a case involving
investigation of a bank robbery by police.236 Police officers arrested Matlock in the front
yard of a home in which he had been living.237 Rather than seeking consent from Matlock
himself, officers placed Matlock in their squad car and went to the door of the house
without him.238 The Marshall family, of whom Gayle Graff was a daughter, was leasing
the home.239 Graff answered the door, and upon hearing from the officers that they were
looking for money and a gun, consented to a search of the home, including the bedroom
she “jointly occupied” with Matlock.240 In their search of the room, officers recovered
$4995 cash in a diaper bag.241
The search in Matlock raised the question of whether Graff, as a “third party,” had
the authority to give police consent to search a room she shared with Matlock.242 The Court
found the “common authority” Graff would need to provide such consent depended on the
“relationship” she had to the area searched.243 In particular, “common authority” was based
“on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most
purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to
permit the inspection in his own right.”244 Mutual access or joint use suggests that all
inhabitants had “assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area
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to be searched.”245 Thus, Matlock, in sharing a room with Graff, assumed a risk that Graff
would open the door to others.246
The Court expanded on third party consent in Georgia v. Randolph, a case arising
out of the troubled marriage of Scott and Janet Randolph.247 Police responded to a domestic
dispute where each spouse accused the other of substance abuse,248 and Janet volunteered
to police that there were “items of drug evidence” confirming Scott’s use of cocaine in the
home.249 While Janet readily gave consent for police to search the house, Scott
“unequivocally refused.”250 An officer then followed Janet into a bedroom in the home and
recovered “a section of a drinking straw with a powdery residue,” which was later offered
as evidence of Scott’s possession of cocaine.251
The Court in Randolph inquired whether a search is reasonable when police obtain
“the permission of one occupant” even though the other occupant, “who later seeks to
suppress the evidence, is present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent.”252 The
Court held, “a physically present co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry prevails,
rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him,”253 basing its holding
on “widely shared social expectations.”254 The reasonableness of the officer’s search of
Scott’s home was “in significant part a function of commonly held understanding about
the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other's interests.”255
Randolph applied its social expectations rule to a series of examples.256 In Matlock,
for instance, when Graff came to the door of her home “with a baby at her hip,”
she shows that she belongs there, and that fact standing alone is enough to
tell a law enforcement officer or any other visitor that if she occupies the
place along with others, she probably lives there subject to the assumption
tenants usually make about their common authority when they share
quarters.257
By living with Graff, Matlock assumed a risk that Graff could admit a guest Matlock found
obnoxious in his absence.258 The Randolph Court offered the contrasting example of a
245
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landlord or hotel manager who would not possess the authority to admit guests in the
absence of the current occupant’s consent.259 Randolph even offered the instance where
common authority to consent existed but was limited:
[A] child of eight might well be considered to have the power to consent to
the police crossing the threshold into that part of the house where any caller,
such as a pollster or salesman, might well be admitted … but no one would
reasonably expect such a child to be in a position to authorize anyone to
rummage through his parents' bedroom.260
The Court in Randolph then applied its widely-shared social expectations test, concluding,
“a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence that one
occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood
there saying, ‘stay out.’”261 Randolph therefore ruled, “[s]ince the co-tenant wishing to
open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail
over a present and objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police
officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the
absence of any consent at all.”262
The Court applied Randolph’s “widely shared social expectations” rule in its most
recent third party consent case, Fernandez v. California.263 In Fernandez, an officer
knocked on the door of an apartment “from which screams had been heard.”264 Roxanne
Rojas, who answered the door, appeared red-faced and crying, with a “large bump on her
nose,” and blood on her shirt from a seemingly recent injury.265 When the officer sought
entry, Fernandez declared, “‘You don't have any right to come in here. I know my
rights.’”266 Having probable cause to believe Fernandez assaulted Rojas, the officer
arrested Fernandez, taking him to the police station.267 About an hour later, a detective
returned to the apartment, obtained consent from Rojas to enter and search, and recovered
evidence linking Fernandez to a robbery.268
Fernandez confronted the very situation that Randolph considered—a conflict
between two occupants about whether police might enter—but with the crucial difference
that the police had removed the objecting occupant from the premises.269 This factual
difference did not require a new test, for the Court still inquired about the “customary social
usage” in deciding the case.270 The Court in Fernandez acknowledged that “a caller” would
feel uncomfortable accepting an invitation from one occupant if the other commanded she
“stay out.”271 The caller’s hesitation would stem from an expectation of “at best an
259

Id. at 112.
Id.
261
Id. at 113.
262
Id. at 114.
263
Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 303 (2014).
264
Id. at 295.
265
Id.
266
Id. at 296.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 294.
270
Id. at 303.
271
Id. at 303-04.
260

41

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2020

uncomfortable scene and at worst violence if he or she trie[d] to brush past the objector.”272
This same visitor’s “calculus” would be “quite different, however, if the objecting tenant
was not standing at the door.”273 As the Court in Fernandez surmised, “when the objector
is not on the scene (and especially when it is known that the objector will not return during
the course of the visit), the friend or visitor is much more likely to accept the invitation to
enter.”274
The Court, from Matlock to Fernandez, has thus constructed two rules for third party
consent cases: (1) assumption of risk275 and (2) “widely shared social expectations.”276
These tests led the Court to consider typical reactions people might have in all sorts of
relationships, whether as co-tenants,277 estranged husband and wife,278 landlord and
tenant,279 hotelier and guest,280 or domestic violence sufferer and abuser.281 Similarly, third
party consent could offer guidance if law enforcement seeks consent from employers to
access passive monitoring data. Since employees will choose to allow “joint access” to
their employers to information from wearables, phone applications, and beacons, Matlock
indicates that workers assumed a risk that their bosses might share this information with
others, including police.282 Randolph’s “widely shared social expectations” thus requires
the Court to consider the particulars of the corporate culture in which an employee found
herself.283
Correctly applying Randolph’s social expectations principle to the employment
context may require considering the context of Fernandez, which involved social
expectations stemming from power imbalances between the parties involved in a violent
domestic relationship. Although, hopefully not in a situation as nightmarishly dire as that
facing a domestic violence victim, employees often face a power imbalance that can
severely harm their bargaining position with their employer. Such power imbalances could
explain, for instance, a UPS driver’s acceptance of surveillance or an Amazon worker’s
acquiescence in restrictions on bathroom breaks. Such power imbalances raise concerns
about voluntariness. While Roxanne Rojas did not countermand Fernandez’s denial of
entry to police, she let police come in when her abuser was absent and in police custody.284
Similarly, employees will likely choose to avoid offending superiors in their aim to put
food on the table. Employees, all too aware of the power employers hold over their
financial fates, might fail to communicate their true concerns. Justice Souter noted a similar
complication in his concurrence in Davis v. United States.285 He explained, “[s]ocial
science confirms what common sense would suggest, that individuals who feel intimidated
272
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or powerless are more likely to speak in equivocal or nonstandard terms when no ambiguity
or equivocation is meant.”286 Employees, in short, through silence or hesitation, might slip
into situations where they are sharing information that they would rather keep to
themselves.
The Court considered voluntariness in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, a case where a
patrol officer searched a car he had stopped for having a burned out headlight and license
plate light.287 When other police arrived, after the six occupants of the car exited the
vehicle, one of the officers asked if he could search the car.288 One occupant, Alcala, replied
in the affirmative.289 The officers then found three stolen checks wadded up under the left
rear seat, leading to charges against Bustamonte for possessing a check with intent to
defraud.290
To define voluntariness of consent to search under the Fourth Amendment, the Court
in Schnecknoth relied on precedent defining voluntariness of confessions under the
Fourteenth Amendment.291 The Court realized that voluntariness could not “be taken
literally to mean a ‘knowing’ choice’” because even confessions extracted by coercion and
brutality involved knowing the “choice of alternatives.”292 Determining the presence of
voluntariness, instead, involved an inquiry into whether the person’s actions were “the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.”293 If the individual did exercise
such a choice, her will was respected; if not, then her will was “overborne” and her
“capacity for self-determination critically impaired.”294 The Court assessed voluntariness
by looking at “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of
the accused and the details of the interrogation.”295 Since this inquiry weighed all the facts,
voluntariness did not turn on any “single controlling criterion.”296 Therefore, the fact that
a person might not know of his or her right to refuse to answer questions or give consent
was not, in itself, controlling.297 Schneckloth was careful to note, however, that any
compulsion, even if implied or subtle, could undermine voluntariness.298
Such “implied or subtle” coercion could infect an employer-employee relationship
possessing a bargaining power disparity. Schneckloth considered, relevant to the “totality
of the circumstances,” the “possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who
consents.”299 The Court, when weighing consent to passive monitoring, might therefore
consider the relative power inherent in the employee’s position in the company, her level
of education, age, and sophistication.300 This might mean the Court could offer more Fourth
286
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Amendment protection to junior employees and less to supervisors. Further, instead of
assessing the “details of the interrogation” in the employment context, the Court could
consider the behavior of the company and the work environment that it has formed.301
Finally, the fact that a particular employee was not aware of his rights in the company’s
employee handbook would not undermine consent. Schneckloth ruled that ignorance of
one’s constitutional rights, an even greater liability than ignorance of worker rights, did not
make consent involuntary.302 Any “totality of the circumstances” test for employee
consent, relying as it does on all the particular facts of each individual case, fails to ensure
consistent protection for workers in the future from police invasion of passive monitoring
data. Thus, employee privacy protections need a sounder footing.
One potential employee protection might be supplied by Garrity v. New Jersey, a
case in which the Court considered the coercive effects of a threat to one’s job.303 In
Garrity, police officers in New Jersey were convicted of “conspiracy to obstruct the
administration of the traffic laws.”304 Before questioning the officers about fixing traffic
tickets, the Attorney General warned each officer, “that he had the privilege to refuse to
answer if the disclosure would tend to incriminate him.” However, the Attorney General
also warned each officer “that if he refused to answer he would be subject to removal from
office.”305 Given this choice, the officers answered the questions, resulting in their
convictions.306 The Court then considered whether “the fear of being discharged” for
failing to answer questions “made the statements products of coercion in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”307 The choice “between self-incrimination or job forfeiture” was
“likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and
rational choice.”308 Since voluntariness could be destroyed by coercion that was “mental
as well as physical,” Garrity recognized that “[s]ubtle pressures may be as telling as coarse
and vulgar ones.”309 Choosing between a job and exercising a right was the “antithesis” of
a free choice, infecting the statements with coercion in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.310
Similarly, when employees choose to accept passive monitoring, they might be
facing a coercive choice between maintaining their Fourth Amendment right to privacy
and their only practical option for “their means of livelihood.”311 While it is true that they
are making a calculated choice based on their own interests, choosing the lesser of two
evils “does not exclude [the possibility of] duress.”312 To apply Matlock in reasoning that
employees have “assumed the risk” of exposure in such a situation would defy daily
experience. Workers in such a bind face a terrible risk with either choice. It is questionable
301
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whether the Court would consider Garrity, a Fourteenth Amendment due process case, in
any Fourth Amendment consent case.313 Yet, in Schneckloth, the Court borrowed its
analysis of voluntariness for Fourth Amendment consent from the confession cases
analyzed under Fourteenth Amendment due process.314 Still, there is no guarantee that the
Court would apply Garrity to passive monitoring cases. Ultimately, employees sharing
personal data might be placing their privacy in jeopardy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There is some hope that the Court will protect employees from police access to
employers’ passive monitoring data. Carpenter could identify such information as so
detailed and encyclopedic as to create the kind of “comprehensive chronicle” against
which it deemed the Fourth Amendment should stand.315 The Court could also choose to
view the “operational realities” of workplaces implementing passive monitoring as still
requiring privacy for intimate details such as the functioning of an employee’s heart or the
activities occurring in her bedroom.316 Finally, the Court could determine that employees,
in allowing “mutual use” and providing “joint access” to their personal information, still
do not assume the risk that employers would share such details with the government
because such consent would be counter to the “widely shared social expectations” in
workplaces.317 Yet, each relevant test, whether reasonable expectation of privacy, a
workplace’s operational realities, or social expectations, is dependent on how a future
Court will view the details in a particular case and provides little certainty for privacy
protection. Further, with the interminable advance of technologies intruding into our
privacy, and the public’s acceptance of these technologies’ conveniences despite their
invasiveness, privacy from passive monitoring is in danger. Digital intrusions are daily
draining the reasonableness of privacy expectations. Further, companies continue to erode
privacy in the workplace. In this context, employees who allow monitoring could be seen
as assuming a risk that companies will share information, no matter how intimate.
Perhaps, to grapple with the privacy invasions of the twenty-first century, we should
look to musings from the first century. Plutarch, the Greek biographer living in the Roman
Empire, declared, “Character is habit long continued.”318 The actions we take, no matter
our motives, tend to affect ourselves and, for that matter, the world. A decision we make
in an instant out of expediency could, if continually repeated over time or imitated by
others, change our lives. Employees, perhaps bewildered by the impact of ever-advancing
technology in replacing human labor, the lingering effects of the 2008 global recession, or
international trade, might simply feel that they have no good options. If employees want to
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meet the mortgage or qualify for health insurance, they could reasonably swallow their
objections and do the work needed to keep their jobs. This choice, while understandable,
has costs. If an employee accepts passive monitoring today to get a needed pay raise, she
may squander her privacy in the eyes of the Court tomorrow.
With the Court’s current rulings, it might be necessary to view Fourth Amendment
privacy as a precious resource that can be squandered if not carefully conserved. One
employee, succumbing to the pressure of the moment, might have little effect on privacy
doctrine. The accumulated choices of all workers, in contrast, could undermine our Fourth
Amendment right to privacy. Such a prospect might seem terribly unfair, for it is those with
the least power who are called upon, with each individual choice, to protect privacy for all.
The existentialist philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, would offer little sympathy, as he once
declared, “man is condemned to be free: condemned, because he did not create himself, yet
nonetheless free, because once cast into the world, he is responsible for everything he
does.”319 However troubled and limited our lot, we always have a choice about which
actions we take. We cannot escape the consequences of our choices. We have to make
privacy a priority for we might not be able rely on the Court’s current precedent to do so.
If we submit to passive monitoring, putting all our faith in the Court, the resulting stress
from doubt could betray our sleepless nights and pounding hearts to our ever-watchful
employers.
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